The complexity of algorithms that compute strategies or operate on them typically depends
on the representation length of the strategies involved. One measure for the size of a mixed …

We explain algorithms for computing Nash equilibria of two-player games given in strategic
form or extensive form. The strategic form is a table that lists the players' strategies and …

This paper is a self-contained survey of algorithms for computing Nash equilibria of two-
person games. The games may be given in strategic form or extensive form. The classical …

We show how to find a normal form proper equilibrium in behavior strategies of a given two-
player zero-sum extensive form game with imperfect information but perfect recall. Our …

This paper presents an algorithm for computing an equilibrium of an extensive two‐person
game with perfect recall. The method is computationally efficient by virtue of using the …

We consider the task of computing an approximation of a trembling hand perfect equilibrium
for an n-player game in strategic form, n≥ 3. We show that this task is complete for the …

Consider a very simple class of (finite) games: after an initial move by nature, each player
makes one move. Moreover, the players have common interests: at each node, all the …

We consider finding maximin strategies and equilibria of explicitly given extensive form
games with imperfect information but with no moves of chance. We show that a maximin …

Despite the many recent practical and theoretical breakthroughs in computational game
theory, equilibrium finding in extensive-form team games remains a significant challenge …

It is known that an equilibrium of an infinitely repeated two-player game (with limit average
payoffs) can be computed in polynomial time, as follows: according to the folk theorem, we …