A range of arguments are presented to demonstrate that (1) human visual orientations are
conceptually constituted (concept‐bound);(2) the concept‐boundedness of visual …

In this paper, I offer a discussion concerning the conceptual connection between the notion
of vision-for-action and the one of affordance perception. I first analyze the notion of vision …

We perceive as much as we do because, in a way, we perceive so little. Traditional
approaches to perception have found it difficult to accom-modate the distinctive amodality of …

How do questions concerning consciousness and phenomenal experience relate to, or
interface with, questions concerning plans, knowledge and intentions? At least in the case of …

The difference between perception and cognition seems introspectively obvious in many
cases. Perceiving and thinking have also been assigned quite different roles, in …

Why does the world look to us as it does? Generally speaking, this question has received
two types of answers in the cognitive sciences in the past fifty or so years. According to the …

We represent the world in a variety of ways: through percepts, concepts, propositional
attitudes, words, numerals, recordings, musical scores, photographs, diagrams, mimetic …

The philosophy of perception is a microcosm of the metaphysics of mind. Its central
problems—What is perception? What is the nature of perceptual consciousness? How can …

I'm very dubious about how much any of our ordinary experience is verbalized, but there is
no doubt at all that very little of the scientific experience is verbalized. The more one thinks of …

This article is about a sidebar in James Gibson's last book, The ecological approach to
visual perception. In this sidebar, Gibson, the founder of the ecological perspective of …