Observable contracts: Strategic delegation and cooperation
The role of commitments in noncooperative games is well acknowledged and documented.
One way to achieve commitments is by letting delegates represent the players of a game. In …
One way to achieve commitments is by letting delegates represent the players of a game. In …
Observable Contracts: Strategic Delegation and Cooperation
C Fershtman, KL Judd, E Kalai - 1990 - econstor.eu
Observable Contracts: Strategic Delegation and Cooperation Page 1 Fershtman, Chaim; Judd,
Kenneth L.; Kalai, Ehud Working Paper Observable Contracts: Strategic Delegation and …
Kenneth L.; Kalai, Ehud Working Paper Observable Contracts: Strategic Delegation and …
Observable Contracts: Strategic Delegation and Cooperation
C Fershtman, K Judd, E Kalai - International Economic …, 1991 - econpapers.repec.org
The role of commitments in noncooperative games is well acknowledged and documented.
One way to achieve commitments is by letting delegates represent the players of a game. In …
One way to achieve commitments is by letting delegates represent the players of a game. In …
Observable Contracts: Strategic Delegation and Cooperation
C Fershtman, KL Judd, E Kalai - 1990 - ideas.repec.org
The role of commitments in noncooperative games is well acknowledged and documented.
One way to achieve commitments is by letting delegates represent the players of a game. In …
One way to achieve commitments is by letting delegates represent the players of a game. In …
[引用][C] Observable Contracts: Strategic Delegation and Cooperation
C Fershtman, K Judd, E Kalai - International Economic …, 1991 - scholars.northwestern.edu
Observable Contracts: Strategic Delegation and Cooperation — Northwestern Scholars Skip to
main navigation Skip to search Skip to main content Northwestern Scholars Home Northwestern …
main navigation Skip to search Skip to main content Northwestern Scholars Home Northwestern …
[PDF][PDF] Observable Contracts: Strategic Delegation and Cooperation
C Fershtman, KL Judd, E Kalai - INTERNATIONAL, ECONOMIC …, 1991 - kenjudd.org
The role of commitments in noncooperative games is well acknowledged and documented.
One way to achieve commitments is by letting delegates represent the players of a game. In …
One way to achieve commitments is by letting delegates represent the players of a game. In …
OBSERVABLE CONTRACTS: STRATEGIC DELEGATION AND COOPERATION.
C Fershtman, KL Judd, E Kalai - International Economic …, 1991 - search.ebscohost.com
The role of commitments in noncooperative games is welt acknowledged and documented.
One way to achieve commitments is by letting delegates represent the players of a game. In …
One way to achieve commitments is by letting delegates represent the players of a game. In …
[引用][C] Observable Contracts: Strategic Delegation and Cooperation
C Fershtman, KL Judd, E Kalai - International Economic Review, 1991 - cir.nii.ac.jp
[引用][C] Observable Contracts: Strategic Delegation and Cooperation
C Fershtman, K Judd, E Kalai - 1990 - econpapers.repec.org
EconPapers: Observable Contracts: Strategic Delegation and Cooperation EconPapers Economics
at your fingertips EconPapers Home About EconPapers Working Papers Journal Articles Books …
at your fingertips EconPapers Home About EconPapers Working Papers Journal Articles Books …
Observable Contracts: Strategic Delegation and Cooperation
C Fershtman, KL Judd, E Kalai - International Economic Review, 1991 - ideas.repec.org
The role of commitments in noncooperative games is well acknowledged and documented.
One way to achieve commitments is by letting delegates represent the players of a game. In …
One way to achieve commitments is by letting delegates represent the players of a game. In …