Explanation and invariance in the special sciences

J Woodward - The British journal for the philosophy of …, 2000 - journals.uchicago.edu
The British journal for the philosophy of science, 2000journals.uchicago.edu
This paper describes an alternative to the common view that explanation in the special
sciences involves subsumption under laws. According to this alternative, whether or not a
generalization can be used to explain has to do with whether it is invariant rather than with
whether it is lawful. A generalization is invariant if it is stable or robust in the sense that it
would continue to hold under a relevant class of changes. Unlike lawfulness, invariance
comes in degrees and has other features that are well suited to capture the characteristics of …
Abstract
This paper describes an alternative to the common view that explanation in the special sciences involves subsumption under laws. According to this alternative, whether or not a generalization can be used to explain has to do with whether it is invariant rather than with whether it is lawful. A generalization is invariant if it is stable or robust in the sense that it would continue to hold under a relevant class of changes. Unlike lawfulness, invariance comes in degrees and has other features that are well suited to capture the characteristics of explanatory generalizations in the special sciences. For example, a generalization can be invariant even if it has exceptions or holds only over a limited spatio-temporal interval. The notion of invariance can be used to resolve a number of dilemmas that arise in standard treatments of explanatory generalizations in the special sciences.
The University of Chicago Press
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