Knowledge and epistemic necessity
J Hawthorne - Philosophical Studies, 2012 - Springer
Philosophical Studies, 2012•Springer
Claims of the form 'I know P and it might be that not-P'tend to sound odd. One natural
explanation of this oddity is that the conjuncts are semantically incompatible: in its core
epistemic use,'Might P'is true in a speaker's mouth only if the speaker does not know that not-
P. In this paper I defend this view against an alternative proposal that has been advocated
by Trent Dougherty and Patrick Rysiew and elaborated upon in Jeremy Fantl and Matthew
McGrath's recent Knowledge in an Uncertain World.
explanation of this oddity is that the conjuncts are semantically incompatible: in its core
epistemic use,'Might P'is true in a speaker's mouth only if the speaker does not know that not-
P. In this paper I defend this view against an alternative proposal that has been advocated
by Trent Dougherty and Patrick Rysiew and elaborated upon in Jeremy Fantl and Matthew
McGrath's recent Knowledge in an Uncertain World.
Abstract
Claims of the form ‘I know P and it might be that not-P’ tend to sound odd. One natural explanation of this oddity is that the conjuncts are semantically incompatible: in its core epistemic use, ‘Might P’ is true in a speaker’s mouth only if the speaker does not know that not-P. In this paper I defend this view against an alternative proposal that has been advocated by Trent Dougherty and Patrick Rysiew and elaborated upon in Jeremy Fantl and Matthew McGrath’s recent Knowledge in an Uncertain World.
Springer
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