The present symposium is a reaction to one of the most stimulating debates that the Chinese philosophical community has seen in years. The vigorous challenges mounted by LIU Qingping prompted a wide-ranging and constructive conversation that has focused in four areas: first, the historical, contextual interpretation of classical Confucian teachings, and their strengths and weaknesses in that context; second, arguments about the continuing cultural influence of these Confucian orientations; third, methodological questions about the proper way to study and develop Chinese philosophy; fourth, more substantive argument about what sort of philosophy one ought to adopt today. As both an important and insightful participant in the debates and the chief force behind organizing and presenting these discussions to a wider public, GUO Qiyong also deserves tremendous credit. Finally, I would like to offer my thanks to HUANG Yong for enabling philosophers outside of China to continue the conversations initiated by Professors LIU and GUO.

In this short essay I will take issue with what I believe is Professor LIU’s most central contention, namely that “consanguineous affection” is the “supreme principle”[Liu 2007, 5] of Confucianism. Another way he puts this is to say that Confucianism “places filial piety absolutely above everything else”[Ibid]. I agree, that is, with Professor GUO’s contention that for neither classical nor neo-Confucians were statements about the importance of filial piety