On the complexity of equilibrium computation in first-price auctions
A Filos-Ratsikas, Y Giannakopoulos… - Proceedings of the …, 2021 - dl.acm.org
Proceedings of the 22nd ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, 2021•dl.acm.org
We consider the problem of computing a (pure) Bayes-Nash equilibrium in the first-price
auction with continuous value distributions and discrete bidding space. We prove that when
bidders have independent subjective prior beliefs about the value distributions of the other
bidders, computing an ε-equilibrium of the auction is PPAD-complete, and computing an
exact equilibrium is FIXP-complete.
auction with continuous value distributions and discrete bidding space. We prove that when
bidders have independent subjective prior beliefs about the value distributions of the other
bidders, computing an ε-equilibrium of the auction is PPAD-complete, and computing an
exact equilibrium is FIXP-complete.
We consider the problem of computing a (pure) Bayes-Nash equilibrium in the first-price auction with continuous value distributions and discrete bidding space. We prove that when bidders have independent subjective prior beliefs about the value distributions of the other bidders, computing an -equilibrium of the auction is PPAD-complete, and computing an exact equilibrium is FIXP-complete.
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