Optimal monetary policy cooperation through state-independent contracts with targets
H Jensen - European Economic Review, 2000 - Elsevier
European Economic Review, 2000•Elsevier
Simple state-independent monetary institutions are shown to secure optimal cooperative
policies in a stochastic, linear-quadratic two-country world with international policy spill-
overs and national credibility problems. Institutions characterize delegation to independent
central bankers facing quadratic performance related contracts punishing or rewarding
deviations from primary and intermediate policy targets.
policies in a stochastic, linear-quadratic two-country world with international policy spill-
overs and national credibility problems. Institutions characterize delegation to independent
central bankers facing quadratic performance related contracts punishing or rewarding
deviations from primary and intermediate policy targets.
Simple state-independent monetary institutions are shown to secure optimal cooperative policies in a stochastic, linear-quadratic two-country world with international policy spill-overs and national credibility problems. Institutions characterize delegation to independent central bankers facing quadratic performance related contracts punishing or rewarding deviations from primary and intermediate policy targets.
Elsevier
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