… election control can be prevented or deterred has been largely ignored. We introduce the
problem of optimal protection against election … allocates limited protection resources to prevent …

… To address these limitations, we consider the problem of optimally protecting elections
against control. We model control as a denial-of-service (deletion) attack on a subset of voter …

… We prove that the OPTIMAL DEFENSE problem is NP-complete for every scoring rule
even if the number of candidates is three and the attacker can attack any number of the voter …

… the attacker chooses an optimal strategy after conducting surveillance. In order to protect
the credibility and integrity of the election, we consider the following model of protection. The …

… the majority of election protocols that support some level of verifiability (either universal or
limited to voters, who can check their own vote) merely provide computational protection of the …

… protecting elections. In their model the defender allocates resources to guard some of the
electoral … for the defender to use a greedy recounting strategy, we can show that it is optimal for …

… to protect the election outcomes from control. In this paper, we consider how to protect election
outcome … Besides, we find that our approximation algorithm outperforms other non-optimal …

… by the attacker and would win the election should there be no bribery attacker. … protection
of elections against bribery. More specifically, we initiate the study of the following protection …

… goal is to protect elections from various attacking actions intended to skew the election’s …
In particular, we try to show either that one can compute in polynomial time an optimal attack of …

… nearoptimal defender strategies and showcase variations in the difficulty of defending
elections … A defender aims to protect the election against this manipulation. Each voter v has a …