Run equilibria in the Green–Lin model of financial intermediation
We study the Green–Lin model of financial intermediation [EJ Green, P. Lin, Implementing
efficient allocations in a model of financial intermediation, J. Econ. Theory 109 (2003) 1–23]
under a more general specification of the distribution of types across agents. We derive the
efficient allocation in closed form. We show that, in some cases, the intermediary cannot
uniquely implement the efficient allocation using a direct revelation mechanism. In these
cases, the mechanism also admits an equilibrium in which some (but not all) agents “run” on …
efficient allocations in a model of financial intermediation, J. Econ. Theory 109 (2003) 1–23]
under a more general specification of the distribution of types across agents. We derive the
efficient allocation in closed form. We show that, in some cases, the intermediary cannot
uniquely implement the efficient allocation using a direct revelation mechanism. In these
cases, the mechanism also admits an equilibrium in which some (but not all) agents “run” on …
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