Say‐on‐pay judgements: the two‐strikes rule and the pay‐performance link
We undertake an experiment to explore shareholder voting behaviour when the pay‐
performance link is weak or strong; and when there has (has not) been a first strike in the
preceding year. We find shareholders are more supportive of a remuneration package
evidencing a strong pay‐performance link than a weak link. Further, shareholders are less
supportive of a remuneration package when there has been a first strike in the preceding
year than when there has not been a first strike. Importantly, we find that a first strike reduces …
performance link is weak or strong; and when there has (has not) been a first strike in the
preceding year. We find shareholders are more supportive of a remuneration package
evidencing a strong pay‐performance link than a weak link. Further, shareholders are less
supportive of a remuneration package when there has been a first strike in the preceding
year than when there has not been a first strike. Importantly, we find that a first strike reduces …
Abstract
We undertake an experiment to explore shareholder voting behaviour when the pay‐performance link is weak or strong; and when there has (has not) been a first strike in the preceding year. We find shareholders are more supportive of a remuneration package evidencing a strong pay‐performance link than a weak link. Further, shareholders are less supportive of a remuneration package when there has been a first strike in the preceding year than when there has not been a first strike. Importantly, we find that a first strike reduces the effect of the pay‐performance link on voting intentions.
Wiley Online Library
以上显示的是最相近的搜索结果。 查看全部搜索结果