The Shapley–Shubik index for multi-criteria simple games
L Monroy, FR Fernández - European Journal of Operational Research, 2011 - Elsevier
L Monroy, FR Fernández
European Journal of Operational Research, 2011•ElsevierIn this paper we address multi-criteria simple games which constitute an extension of the
basic framework of voting systems and related social-choice situations. For these games, we
propose the extended Shapley–Shubik index as the natural generalization of the Shapley–
Shubik index in conventional simple games, and establish an axiomatic characterization of
this power index.
basic framework of voting systems and related social-choice situations. For these games, we
propose the extended Shapley–Shubik index as the natural generalization of the Shapley–
Shubik index in conventional simple games, and establish an axiomatic characterization of
this power index.
In this paper we address multi-criteria simple games which constitute an extension of the basic framework of voting systems and related social-choice situations. For these games, we propose the extended Shapley–Shubik index as the natural generalization of the Shapley–Shubik index in conventional simple games, and establish an axiomatic characterization of this power index.
Elsevier
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