Heavy involvement of the state in managing natural resources has been widespread due to the strategic importance of resources, market failures, and other externalities. However, there has been growing awareness in recent years of the poor performance of government agencies in managing resources, especially at the local level (Rasmussen and Meinzen-Dick 1995). Communitybased management of common property resources (CPRs) is receiving more attention in natural resource management in developing countries as a potential mechanism for increasing the efficacy, legitimacy, and sustainability of natural resources management (Olson 1965). Many studies on the commons have shown that resource users have the capacity to create institutional arrangements and management regimes by themselves that help equitable allocation of resources over long time periods with limited efficiency losses (Agrawal 1999; Ostrom 1990).

In the case of open-access natural resources, the exclusion of beneficiaries through physical and institutional means is costly while exploitation by one user reduces the availability of resources for others. These two characteristics make them difficult to manage effectively and they can easily become degraded through excessive use. In many cases, communities have been able to address the above-mentioned exclusion and substractability problems by devising collective action (Lobe and Berkes 2004). Local collective action is important to develop rules for resource use, monitor compliance with