The supply side of an oligopolistic market supplying a homogeneous product
noncooperatively is modeled. In this market, there is one leader and N followers. The …

Saloner (1987) analyzes a Cournot model with two production periods before the market
clears. If costs do not vary across periods, any point on the outer envelope of the reaction …

We modify the Cournot model by allowing for two production periods before the market
clears. The firms choose outputs simultaneously in the first period. These outputs become …

This work contributes to a number of questions concerning oligopoly models. In particular,
uniqueness of the Cournot equilibrium point is demonstrated under the assumption that …

We consider a stochastic version of the Stackelberg-Nash-Cournot model proposed by
Murphy et al.(Murphy, FH, HD Sherali, AL Soyester. 1983. Stackelberg-Nash-Cournot …

This paper examines the existence of n-firm Cournot equilibrium in a market for a single
homogeneous commodity. It proves that if each firm's marginal revenue declines as the …

Traditional oligopoly models hold that firms compete in the same strategic variable, output
(Cournot) or price (Bertrand). Alternatively, a hybrid model allows some firms to compete in …

This article uses an infinite-regress model of firm-level decisions to find a rational
expectations equilibrium for a duopoly and to relate concepts of conjectural variations and …

We compare an m-firm Cournot model with a hierarchical Stackelberg model where m Firms
choose outputs sequentially. The Stackelberg equilibrium price is lower, so output and total …

A common justification of the concept of competitive equilibrium 1s that the number of
economic agents being “large”, none of them could (and/or hope to) exert any influence on …