This paper derives optimal incentive contracts for agents with other-regarding preferences. It
offers a behavioral explanation for the empirically observed lack of relative performance …

This paper examines the optimal provision of incentives in the repeated setting with many
agents under the restriction that only relative performance evaluation is feasible for …

Most principal agent models predict that increasing incentives result in higher performance.
This paper examines whether this result is valid under real effort conditions. Exposing the …

We conduct a laboratory experiment with agents working on, and principals benefiting from,
a real effort task in which the agents' performance can only be evaluated subjectively …

We study optimal team design. In our model, a principal assigns either heterogeneous
agents to a team (a diverse team) or homogenous agents to a team (a specialized team) to …

We investigate a multi‐agent moral‐hazard model where agents have expectation‐based
reference‐dependent preferences à la Kőszegi and Rabin (2006, 2007). We show that even …

This paper reports on a two‐task principal–agent experiment in which only one task is
contractible. The principal can either offer a piece‐rate contract or a (voluntary) bonus to the …

A principal incentivizes a team of agents to work by privately offering them bonuses
contingent on team success. We study the principal's optimal incentive scheme that …

We study a principal–agent framework in which principals can assign wage-irrelevant goals
to agents. We find evidence that, when given the possibility to set wage-irrelevant goals …

We study a dynamic multi-agent model with a verifiable team performance measure and non-
verifiable individual measures. The optimal contract can be interpreted as an explicit …