Side-channel attacks have become a severe threat to the confidentiality of computer
applications and systems. One popular type of such attacks is the microarchitectural attack …

Over the last two decades, side and covert channel research has shown a variety of ways of
exfiltrating information for a computer system. Processor microarchitectural timing-based …

Modern processors use branch prediction and speculative execution to maximize
performance. For example, if the destination of a branch depends on a memory value that is …

To stop side channel attacks on CPU caches that have allowed attackers to leak secret
information and break basic security mechanisms, the security community has developed a …

We present BranchScope-a new side-channel attack where the attacker infers the direction
of an arbitrary conditional branch instruction in a victim program by manipulating the shared …

Microarchitectural timing channels expose hidden hardware states though timing. We survey
recent attacks that exploit microarchitectural features in shared hardware, especially as they …

Speculative execution attacks present an enormous security threat, capable of reading
arbitrary program data under malicious speculation, and later exfiltrating that data over …

We introduce the first microarchitectural side channel attacks that leverage contention on the
CPU ring interconnect. There are two challenges that make it uniquely difficult to exploit this …

The scatter–gather technique is a commonly implemented approach to prevent cache-based
timing attacks. In this paper, we show that scatter–gather is not constant time. We implement …

Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR) is a widely-used technique that protects
systems against a range of attacks. ASLR works by randomizing the offset of key program …