A simple argument suggests that we can fruitfully model advanced AI systems using
expected utility theory. According to this argument, an agent will need to act as if maximising …

Bounded rationality gets a bad rap in epistemology. It is argued that theories of bounded
rationality are overly context‐sensitive; conventionalist; or dependent on ordinary language …

What is structural rationality? Specifically, what is the distinctive feature of structural
requirements of rationality? Some philosophers have argued, roughly, that the distinctive …

My aim in this paper is to develop a unified solution to three paradoxes of bounded
rationality. The first is the regress problem that incorporating cognitive bounds into models of …

Structural requirements of rationality prohibit various things, like having inconsistent
combinations of attitudes, having means-end incoherent combinations of attitudes, and so …

Some epistemologists think that the Bayesian ideals matter because we can approximate
them. That is, our attitudes can be more or less close to the ones of our ideal Bayesian …

The gambler's fallacy is the tendency to expect random processes to switch more often than
they actually do—for example, to think that after a string of tails, a heads is more likely. It's …

Do people tend to be overconfident? Many think so. They've run studies on whether people
are calibrated: whether their average confidence in their opinions matches the proportion of …

What is the place of coherence, or structural rationality, in good first-personal deliberation?
According to Kolodny (2005), considerations of coherence are irrelevant to good first …