What we believe and what we do not believe has a great impact on what we do and fail to
do. Hence, if we want to act responsibly, we should believe responsibly. However, do we …

Sanford C. Goldberg argues in this volume that epistemic normativity-the sort of normativity
implicated in assessments of whether a belief amounts to knowledge-is grounded in the …

The central question in the debate is whether there are norms of some sort governing our
habits of belief-formation, belief-maintenance, and belief-relinquishment. Is it ever or always …

Moral encroachment holds that the epistemic justification of a belief can be affected by moral
factors. If the belief might wrong a person or group more evidence is required to justify the …

It is plausible that there is a distinctively epistemic standard of correctness for belief. It is also
plausible that there is a range of practical reasons bearing on belief. These theses are often …

Some prominent evidentialists argue that practical considerations cannot be normative
reasons for belief because they can't be motivating reasons for belief. Existing pragmatist …

Epistemic nihilism for inquiry is the claim that there are no epistemic norms of inquiry.
Epistemic nihilism was once the received stance towards inquiry, and I argue that it should …

This paper proposes that the question “What should I believe?” is to be answered in the
same way as the question “What should I do?,” a view I call Equal Treatment. After clarifying …

The ambit of the normative extends beyond the realm of action: just as there are norms of a
distinctively practical kind that govern action, so too are there norms of a distinctively …

The normative force of evidence can seem puzzling. It seems that having conclusive
evidence for a proposition does not, by itself, make it true that one ought to believe the …