Over the last two decades, side and covert channel research has shown a variety of ways of
exfiltrating information for a computer system. Processor microarchitectural timing-based …

The recent Spectre attack first showed how to inject incorrect branch targets into a victim
domain by poisoning microarchitectural branch prediction history. In this paper, we …

Intel has introduced a hardware-based trusted execution environment, Intel Software Guard
Extensions (SGX), that provides a secure, isolated execution environment, or enclave, for a …

We present an effective implementation of the Prime+ Probe side-channel attack against the
last-level cache. We measure the capacity of the covert channel the attack creates and …

We present BranchScope-a new side-channel attack where the attacker infers the direction
of an arbitrary conditional branch instruction in a victim program by manipulating the shared …

A timing channel is a communication channel that can transfer information to a
receiver/decoder by modulating the timing behavior of an entity. Examples of this entity …

Microarchitectural timing channels expose hidden hardware states though timing. We survey
recent attacks that exploit microarchitectural features in shared hardware, especially as they …

Sharing memory pages between non-trusting processes is a common method of reducing
the memory footprint of multi-tenanted systems. In this paper we demonstrate that, due to a …

In modern computing environments, hardware resources are commonly shared, and parallel
computation is widely used. Parallel tasks can cause privacy and security problems if proper …

We introduce the first microarchitectural side channel attacks that leverage contention on the
CPU ring interconnect. There are two challenges that make it uniquely difficult to exploit this …