Discerning the primary epistemic harm in cases of testimonial injustice

G Pohlhaus Jr - Social Epistemology, 2014 - Taylor & Francis
This article examines the primary epistemic harm of testimonial injustice, or, as defined by
Miranda Fricker, the injustice of perceiving another epistemic agent as less credible due to …

[引用][C] Discerning the Primary Epistemic Harm in Cases of Testimonial Injustice

G Pohlhaus Jr - Social Epistemology, 2014 - philpapers.org
Gaile Pohlhaus, Discerning the Primary Epistemic Harm in Cases of Testimonial Injustice -
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Discerning the Primary Epistemic Harm in Cases of Testimonial Injustice

G Pohlhaus - Social Epistemology, 2014 - ingentaconnect.com
This article examines the primary epistemic harm of testimonial injustice, or, as defined by
Miranda Fricker, the injustice of perceiving another epistemic agent as less credible due to …