There are mental actions, and a number of epistemic attitudes involve activity. But can there
be epistemic agency? I argue that there is a limit to any claim that we can be epistemic …

Many philosophers hold that we exercise some form of epistemic agency: that we can be
active, rather than passive, in relation to our beliefs. This con viction is expressed in various …

The bounds of agency—of our capacities to act in the world—are re vealed in our
commitments. We tend to think that our moral commitments, for example, emerge from our …

It is tempting to think (though many deny) that epistemic agents exercise a distinctive kind of
control over their belief‐like attitudes. My aim here is to sketch a “bottom‐up” model of …

We naturally see ourselves as capable of being active with respect to the matter of what we
believe–as capable of epistemic agency. A natural view is that we can exercise such agency …

In this paper, I argue for a conditional parity thesis: if we are agents with respect to our
intentions, we are agents with respect to our beliefs. In the final section, I motivate a …

It is undeniable that there is mental action, that there are mental episodes which involve
agency. But is thinking a form of action? Many doubt it. A similar question can be raised …

An action-oriented epistemology takes the idea that our capacity for belief subserves our
capacity for action as the starting point for epistemological theorizing. This paper argues that …

A recent view in contemporary epistemology holds that practical reasoning is governed by
an epistemic norm. Evidence for the existence of this norm is provided by the ways in which …

In this paper I consider whether there can be such things as epistemic reasons for action. I
consider three arguments to the contrary and argue that none are successful, being either …