The book presents a thoroughly elaborated logical theory of generalized truth-values
understood as subsets of some established set of (basic) truth values. After elucidating the …

Abstract In Philosophical Logic, the Liar Paradox has been used to motivate the introduction
of both truth value gaps and truth value gluts. Moreover, in the light of “revenge Liar” …

We introduce an abstract algebraic structure–a lattice defined on a generalized truth value
space of constructive logic. For background one can refer to the idea of 'under …

Publisher Summary This chapter provides an overview of the many-valued logics. From a
philosophical, especially epistemological point of view, the semantic aspect of (classical) …

In Belnap's useful 4-valued logic, the set 2={T, F} of classical truth values is generalized to
the set 4=℘(2)={∅,{T},{F},{T, F}}. In the present paper, we argue in favor of extending this …

A critical view of the alleged significance of Belnap four-valued logic for reasoning under
inconsistent and incomplete information is provided. The difficulty lies in the confusion …

The present paper interweaves various themes. Two main themes are four valued logic and
the Liar Paradox. Each main theme divides into two interconnected subthemes: four valued …

In this introductory chapter, we show how Gottlob Frege's notion of a truth value has become
part of the standard philosophical and logical terminology. Nowadays, the notion of a truth …

Conclusion While Kripke's original paper on the theory of truth used a three-valued logic, we
believe a four-valued version is more natural. Its use allows for possible inconsistencies in …

Truth is one of the oldest and most central topics in philosophy. Formal theories explore the
connections between truth and logic, and they address truth-theoretic paradoxes such as the …