I argue that bounded agents face a systematic accuracy–coherence tradeoff in cognition.
Agents must choose whether to structure their cognition in ways likely to promote coherence …

Probabilistic coherence is not an absolute requirement of rationality; nevertheless, it is an
ideal of rationality with substantive normative import. An idealized rational agent who …

An increasingly prevalent approach to studying human cognition is to construe the mind as
optimally allocating limited cognitive resources among cognitive processes. Under this …

Limited reasoning about rationality is well understood to lead to important behavioral
consequences. The literature has typically viewed such limited reasoning as an artifact of …

Bayesians have a seemingly attractive account of rational credal states in terms of
coherence. An agent's set of credences (degrees of belief) are synchronically coherent just …

One of the most discussed issues in psychology—presently and in the past—is how to
define and measure the extent to which human cognition is rational. The rationality of human …

The move to imprecise credence models leaves many formal norms of rationality
surprisingly intact, as rational constraints on precise credences are often reinterpreted as …

Structural requirements of rationality prohibit various things, like having inconsistent
combinations of attitudes, having means-end incoherent combinations of attitudes, and so …

Practical deliberation consists in thinking about what to do. Such deliberation is deemed
rational when it conforms to certain normative requirements. What is often ignored is the role …

All forms of cognition, whether natural or artificial, are subject to constraints of their
computing architecture. This assumption forms the tenet of virtually all general theories of …