Abstract This article revisits Miranda Fricker's Epistemic Injustice (2007) through one specific
aspect of Axel Honneth's recognition theory. Taking a first cue from Honneth's critique of the …

The notion of recognition is an ethically potent resource for understanding human relational
needs; and its negative counterpart, misrecognition, an equally potent resource for critique …

“Culpability for Epistemic Injustice: Deontic of Aretetic” is an excellent piece of constructive
criticism of Miranda Fricker's important work on testimonial injustice. I agree with much that …

This paper focuses on several issues that arise in Miranda Fricker's book Epistemic injustice
surrounding her claims about our (moral) culpability for perpetrating acts of testimonial …

This paper criticises Miranda Fricker's account of the primary harm of testimonial injustice as
a kind of epistemic objectification, where the latter is understood on the model provided by …

Miranda Fricker distinguishes two senses in which testimonial injustice is epistemic. In the
primary sense, it is epistemic because it harms the victim as a giver of knowledge. In the …

This chapter examines the type of harms caused by testimonial and hermeneutical injustice
and argues that Fricker's account of epistemic harm would be improved by the pragmatist …

This article examines the primary epistemic harm of testimonial injustice, or, as defined by
Miranda Fricker, the injustice of perceiving another epistemic agent as less credible due to …

First, we would like to thank the editors of Feminist Philosophy Quarterly for allowing us to
guest edit a special issue of this exciting journal. The papers comprising this special issue …

In this elegant and groundbreaking work, Miranda Fricker names the phenomenon of
epistemic injustice, and distinguishes two central forms of it, with their two corresponding …