Recent work in experimental philosophy has indicated that intuitions may be subject to
several forms of bias, thereby casting doubt on the viability of intuition as an evidential …

Recent experimental studies indicate that epistemically irrelevant factors can skew our
intuitions, and that some degree of scepticism about appealing to intuition in philosophy is …

The “expertise defense” is the claim that philosophers have special expertise that allows
them to resist the biases suggested by the findings of experimental philosophers. Typically …

Experimental philosophers have empirically challenged the connection between intuition
and philosophical expertise. This paper reviews these challenges alongside other research …

Recent experimental philosophy arguments have raised trouble for philosophers' reliance
on armchair intuitions. One popular line of response has been the expertise defense …

My topic is two-fold: a reductive account of expertise as an epistemic phenomenon, and
applying the reductive account to the question of whether or not philosophers enjoy …

Recent experimental philosophy arguments have raised trouble for philosophers' reliance
on armchair intuitions. One popular line of response has been the expertise defense …

Experimental restrictionists have challenged philosophers' reliance on intuitions about
thought experiment cases based on experimental findings. According to the expertise …

Experimental philosophers have challenged friends of the expertise defense to show that (a)
the intuitive judgments of professional philosophers are different from the intuitive judgments …

Reductive intellectualists about knowledge-how (eg, Stanley & Williamson Journal of
Philosophy 98, 411–44, 2001; Stanley Noûs 45, 207–38, 2011a, 2011b; Brogaard …