Honesty in signalling games is maintained by trade-offs rather than costs
Background Signal reliability poses a central problem for explaining the evolution of
communication. According to Zahavi's Handicap Principle, signals are honest only if they are …
communication. According to Zahavi's Handicap Principle, signals are honest only if they are …
Reputation and cooperation in social dilemma games
F Samu - 2023 - phd.lib.uni-corvinus.hu
A human solution to the problem of cooperation is the maintenance of informal reputation
hierarchies. Reputational information contributes to cooperation by providing guidelines …
hierarchies. Reputational information contributes to cooperation by providing guidelines …
Pervasive signaling
BD Bernheim, AL Bodoh‐Creed - Theoretical Economics, 2023 - Wiley Online Library
How does the increasing publicness of decisions (due, eg, to social media) affect the total
costs of social signaling distortions? While pervasive signaling may induce pervasive …
costs of social signaling distortions? While pervasive signaling may induce pervasive …
Honest Signalling Made Simple
Honest communication is a common phenomenon in animal behaviour, and is frequently
explained by appeal to the so-called handicap hypothesis by which signal costs deter …
explained by appeal to the so-called handicap hypothesis by which signal costs deter …
[PDF][PDF] Institute of Communication and Sociology
S Számadó - phd.lib.uni-corvinus.hu
My dissertation begins with the concluding lines of Attila Bartis's work titled Tranquillity,
which choice requires an explanation. Even those readers who are unfamiliar with the work …
which choice requires an explanation. Even those readers who are unfamiliar with the work …
[PDF][PDF] THESIS SYNOPSIS
F Samu - phd.lib.uni-corvinus.hu
In the first study the dissertation tests experimentally whether competition damage the
reliance on reputation in a non-iterative two-player Prisoner's Dilemma game with a …
reliance on reputation in a non-iterative two-player Prisoner's Dilemma game with a …