Honesty in signalling games is maintained by trade-offs rather than costs

S Számadó, I Zachar, D Czégel, DJ Penn - BMC biology, 2023 - Springer
Background Signal reliability poses a central problem for explaining the evolution of
communication. According to Zahavi's Handicap Principle, signals are honest only if they are …

Reputation and cooperation in social dilemma games

F Samu - 2023 - phd.lib.uni-corvinus.hu
A human solution to the problem of cooperation is the maintenance of informal reputation
hierarchies. Reputational information contributes to cooperation by providing guidelines …

The trade-offs of honest and dishonest signals

S Számadó, I Zachar, DJ Penn - 2023 - ecoevorxiv.org
Explaining the evolution of honest versus dishonest signals under conflicts of interest has
long posed a major challenge, but several recent developments should spur renewed …

Pervasive signaling

BD Bernheim, AL Bodoh‐Creed - Theoretical Economics, 2023 - Wiley Online Library
How does the increasing publicness of decisions (due, eg, to social media) affect the total
costs of social signaling distortions? While pervasive signaling may induce pervasive …

Honest Signalling Made Simple

J Chisausky, C Bergstrom, K Zollman, G Ruxton - 2023 - ecoevorxiv.org
Honest communication is a common phenomenon in animal behaviour, and is frequently
explained by appeal to the so-called handicap hypothesis by which signal costs deter …

[PDF][PDF] Institute of Communication and Sociology

S Számadó - phd.lib.uni-corvinus.hu
My dissertation begins with the concluding lines of Attila Bartis's work titled Tranquillity,
which choice requires an explanation. Even those readers who are unfamiliar with the work …

[PDF][PDF] THESIS SYNOPSIS

F Samu - phd.lib.uni-corvinus.hu
In the first study the dissertation tests experimentally whether competition damage the
reliance on reputation in a non-iterative two-player Prisoner's Dilemma game with a …