This chapter surveys the recent empirical literature and adds to the evidence on takeover
bids for US targets, 1980–2005. The availability of machine readable transaction databases …

This essay surveys the extant literature and adds to the empirical evidence on issuance
activity, flotation costs, and valuation effects of security offerings. We focus primarily on …

This paper develops an account of the role and significance of managerial power and rent
extraction in executive compensation. Under the optimal contracting approach to executive …

The principal-agent model of executive compensation is of central importance to the modern
theory of the firm and corporate governance, yet the exiting empirical evidence supporting it …

This paper examines both empirically and theoretically the growth of US executive pay
during the period 1993–2003. During this period, pay has grown much beyond the increase …

Industry concentration measures calculated with Compustat data, which cover only the
public firms in an industry, are poor proxies for actual industry concentration. These …

We study the impact of contractual incentives on the performance of mutual funds. We find
that high-incentive contracts induce managers to take more risk and reduce the funds' …

This paper develops a novel trade‐off view of corporate governance. Using a model that
integrates agency costs and bargaining benefits of management‐friendly provisions, we …

We study a competitive model in which managers differ in ability and choose unobservable
effort. Each firm chooses its size, how able a manager is to hire, and managerial …

This chapter provides a survey of payout policy—the return of capital by firms to their equity
investors through dividends and share repurchases. The modern study of payout policy is …