Strategyproof social choice
S Barberà - Handbook of social choice and welfare, 2011 - Elsevier
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Voting rules, manipulability and social homogeneity
D Lepelley, F Valognes - Public Choice, 2003 - Springer
To what extent are some voting rules more vulnerable tostrategic manipulation than others?
In order to answer thisquestion, representations are developed for the …
In order to answer thisquestion, representations are developed for the …
[图书][B] Arrovian aggregation models
FT Aleskerov - 2013 - books.google.com
Aggregation of individual opinions into a social decision is a problem widely observed in
everyday life. For centuries people tried to invent thebest'aggregation rule. In 1951 young …
everyday life. For centuries people tried to invent thebest'aggregation rule. In 1951 young …
Borda rule, Copeland method and strategic manipulation
P Favardin, D Lepelley, J Serais - Review of Economic Design, 2002 - Springer
The voting situations at which the Borda rule or the Copeland method can be manipulated
by a single voter or a coalition of voters in three-alternative elections are characterized. From …
by a single voter or a coalition of voters in three-alternative elections are characterized. From …
And the loser is… plurality voting
JF Laslier - Electoral systems: paradoxes, assumptions, and …, 2011 - Springer
Experts have different opinions as to which is the best voting procedure. The Leverhulme
Trust sponsored 2010 Voting Power in Practice workshop, held at the Chateau du Baffy …
Trust sponsored 2010 Voting Power in Practice workshop, held at the Chateau du Baffy …
Social choice rules, fallback bargaining, and related games in common resource conflicts
Due to the lack of resources, individuals, groups, or countries are more involved in common
resource conflicts. This paper uses the Graph Model for Conflict Resolution methodology to …
resource conflicts. This paper uses the Graph Model for Conflict Resolution methodology to …
Some further results on the manipulability of social choice rules
P Favardin, D Lepelley - Social Choice and Welfare, 2006 - Springer
A typology of electoral environments in which strategic manipulation of voting rules can
occur is proposed. From this typology, six different concepts of equilibria (or quasi-equilibria) …
occur is proposed. From this typology, six different concepts of equilibria (or quasi-equilibria) …
Statistical evaluation of voting rules
We generate synthetic elections using two sources of survey data, two spatial models, and
two standard models from the voting literature, IAC and IC. For each election that we …
two standard models from the voting literature, IAC and IC. For each election that we …
Exact results on manipulability of positional voting rules
G Pritchard, MC Wilson - Social Choice and Welfare, 2007 - Springer
We consider 3-candidate elections under a general scoring rule and derive precise
conditions for a given voting situation to be strategically manipulable by a given coalition of …
conditions for a given voting situation to be strategically manipulable by a given coalition of …
Social threshold aggregations
FT Aleskerov, VV Chistyakov, VA Kalyagin - Social Choice and Welfare, 2010 - Springer
A problem of axiomatic construction of a social decision function is studied for the case when
individual opinions of agents are given as m-graded preferences with arbitrary integer m≥ …
individual opinions of agents are given as m-graded preferences with arbitrary integer m≥ …