This paper develops a price-theoretic framework for matching markets with heterogeneous
preferences. The model departs from the Gale and Shapley model by assuming that a finite …

Coordinated single-offer school assignment systems are a popular education reform. We
show that uncoordinated offers in NYC's school assignment mechanism generated …

In school choice, children submit a preference ranking over schools to a centralized
assignment algorithm, which takes into account schools' priorities over children and uses …

Coordinated single-offer school assignment systems are a popular education reform. We
show that uncoordinated offers in NYC's school assignment mechanism generated …

A feasible assignment is rank efficient if its distribution over agents' ranks of their allocations
cannot be stochastically dominated by that of another feasible assignment. Rank efficiency …

In many two-sided matching markets, agents on one side are matched to a large number of
agents on the other side (eg college admissions). Yet little is known about the structure of …

Strategy-Proof Fair School Placement Page 1 Strategy-Proof Fair School Placement ∗ José
Alcalde † Antonio Romero-Medina ‡ March 13, 2015 ∗The authors acknowledge Salvador …

We study a general class of priority-based allocation problems with weak priority orders and
identify conditions under which there exists a strategy-proof mechanism which always …

This thesis combines three essays on empirical applications and methods in two-sided
matching markets. The first essay uses existing methods to estimate preferences for schools …

In this thesis, I study how data-driven optimization can be used to improve school choice. In
a typical school choice system, each student receives a set of school options, called the …