This paper summarizes the display advertising literature, organizing the content by the
agents in the display advertising ecosystem, and proposes new research directions. In doing …

In classic auction theory, reserve prices are known to be effective for improving revenue for
the auctioneer against quasi-linear utility maximizing bidders. The introduction of reserve …

We provide an introduction to the recent developments of dynamic mechanism design, with
a primary focus on the quasilinear case. First, we describe socially optimal (or efficient) …

Auto-bidding has become one of the main options for bidding in online advertisements, in
which advertisers only need to specify high-level objectives and leave the complex task of …

Using AI approaches to automatically design mechanisms has been a central research
mission at the interface of AI and economics [Conitzer and Sandholm, 2002]. Previous …

We introduce a new approach for computing optimal equilibria via learning in games. It
applies to extensive-form settings with any number of players, including mechanism design …

We consider the problem of repeatedly auctioning a single item to multiple iid buyers who
each use a no-regret learning algorithm to bid over time. In particular, we study the seller's …

We study the quality of outcomes in repeated games when the population of players is
dynamically changing, and where participants use learning algorithms to adapt to the …

How should one sell an item to a buyer whose value for the item will only be realized next
week? Eg consider selling a flight to some executive who may or may not have a meeting …

We study autobidding ad auctions with user costs, where each bidder is value-maximizing
subject to a return-over-investment (ROI) constraint, and the seller aims to maximize the …