Envy-freeness up to any item with high Nash welfare: The virtue of donating items

I Caragiannis, N Gravin, X Huang - … of the 2019 ACM Conference on …, 2019 - dl.acm.org
Several fairness concepts have been proposed recently in attempts to approximate envy-
freeness in settings with indivisible goods. Among them, the concept of envy-freeness up to …

A budget feasible incentive mechanism for weighted coverage maximization in mobile crowdsensing

Z Zheng, F Wu, X Gao, H Zhu, S Tang… - IEEE Transactions on …, 2016 - ieeexplore.ieee.org
Mobile crowdsensing is a novel paradigm to collect sensing data and extract useful
information about regions of interest. It widely employs incentive mechanisms to recruit a …

MeLoDy: A Long-Term Dynamic Quality-Aware Incentive Mechanism for Crowdsourcing

H Wang, S Guo, J Cao, M Guo - IEEE transactions on parallel …, 2017 - ieeexplore.ieee.org
Crowdsourcing allows requesters to allocate tasks to a group of workers on the Internet to
make use of their collective intelligence. Quality control is a key design objective in incentive …

Double or nothing: Multiplicative incentive mechanisms for crowdsourcing

NB Shah, D Zhou - Journal of Machine Learning Research, 2016 - jmlr.org
Crowdsourcing has gained immense popularity in machine learning applications for
obtaining large amounts of labeled data. Crowdsourcing is cheap and fast, but suffers from …

Privacy-preserving data aggregation for mobile crowdsensing with externality: An auction approach

M Zhang, L Yang, S He, M Li… - IEEE/ACM Transactions …, 2021 - ieeexplore.ieee.org
We develop an auction framework for privacy-preserving data aggregation in mobile
crowdsensing, where the platform plays the role as an auctioneer to recruit workers for …

Approval voting and incentives in crowdsourcing

NB Shah, D Zhou - ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation …, 2020 - dl.acm.org
The growing need for labeled training data has made crowdsourcing a vital tool for
developing machine learning applications. Here, workers on a crowdsourcing platform are …

Regularized minimax conditional entropy for crowdsourcing

D Zhou, Q Liu, JC Platt, C Meek, NB Shah - arXiv preprint arXiv …, 2015 - arxiv.org
There is a rapidly increasing interest in crowdsourcing for data labeling. By crowdsourcing, a
large number of labels can be often quickly gathered at low cost. However, the labels …

ULPT: A user-centric location privacy trading framework for mobile crowd sensing

W Jin, M Xiao, L Guo, L Yang… - IEEE Transactions on …, 2021 - ieeexplore.ieee.org
Mobile crowd sensing (MCS) arises as a promising data collection paradigm that leverages
the power of ubiquitous mobile devices to acquire rich information regarding their …

Triple eagle: Simple, fast and practical budget-feasible mechanisms

K Han, Y Wu, H Huang, S Cui - Advances in Neural …, 2023 - proceedings.neurips.cc
We revisit the classical problem of designing Budget-Feasible Mechanisms (BFMs) for
submodular valuation functions, which has been extensively studied since the seminal …

Perception of the purchase budget (BGT) and purchase intention in smartphone selling industry: A cross-country analysis

K N'da, J Ge, S Ji-Fan Ren, J Wang - Plos one, 2023 - journals.plos.org
The study explores the direct and mediated impacts of customers' perception of purchase
budget (BGT) on purchase intention (PIT) through perceived quality (PPQ), perceived price …