This paper presents historical remarks on key projects and papers that led to the
development of a theory of event diagnosis for discrete event systems modeled by finite …

Computing systems often deliberately release (or declassify) sensitive information. A
principal security concern for systems permitting information release is whether this release …

Abstract Information flow control (IFC) checks whether a program can leak secret data to
public ports, or whether critical computations can be influenced from outside. But many IFC …

Computing systems often deliberately release (or declassify) sensitive information. A
principal security concern for systems permitting information release is whether this release …

Much work on security-typed languages lacks a satisfactory account of intentional
information release. In the context of confidentiality, a typical security guarantee provided by …

Abstract Information-flow control tracks how information propagates through the program
during execution to make sure that the program handles the information securely. Secure …

Information security has a challenge to address: enabling information-flow controls with
expressive information release (or declassification) policies. Existing approaches tend to …

In traditional information-flow type systems, the security policy is often formalized as
noninterference properties. However, noninterference alone is too strong to express security …

A long-standing problem in information security is how to specify and enforce expressive
security policies that control information flow while also permitting information release (ie …

Noninterference requires that there is no information flow from sensitive to public data in a
given system. However, many systems perform intentional release of sensitive information …