Network design is a fundamental problem for which it is important to understand the effects
of strategic behavior. Given a collection of self-interested agents who want to form a network …

The price of anarchy, defined as the ratio of the worst-case objective function value of a
Nash equilibrium of a game and that of an optimal outcome, quantifies the inefficiency of …

A strong equilibrium is a pure Nash equilibrium which is resilient to deviations by coalitions.
We define the strong price of anarchy (SPoA) to be the ratio of the worst strong equilibrium to …

Given a collection of selfish agents who wish to establish links to route traffic among
themselves, the set of equilibrium network topologies may appear quite different from the …

Designing and deploying a network protocol determines the rules by which end users
interact with each other and with the network. We consider the problem of designing a …

We study Nash equilibria in the setting of network creation games introduced recently by
Fabrikant, Luthra, Maneva, Papadimitriou, and Shenker. In this game we have a set of …

We consider a model of game-theoretic network design initially studied by Anshelevich et
al.[2], where selfish players select paths in a network to minimize their cost, which is …

In this work we study cost sharing connection games, where each player has a source and
sink he would like to connect, and the cost of the edges is either shared equally (fair …

Large computer networks such as the Internet are built, operated, and used by a large
number of diverse and competitive entities. In light of these competing forces, it is surprising …

We study the problem of minimizing the diameter of a graph by adding k shortcut edges, for
speeding up communication in an existing network design. We develop constant-factor …