Populism, political pressure and central bank (in) dependence

D Masciandaro, F Passarelli - Open Economies Review, 2020 - Springer
This article analyses the relationships between inequality, political pressure, populism and
central bank independence (CBI). If there is financial inequality across citizens, monetary …

[PDF][PDF] The Riksbank's balance sheet and financial independence

D Kjellberg, D Vestin - 2019 - elischolar.library.yale.edu
Financial independence prevents the Riksbank's financial position from having a negative
impact on its tasks concerning price stability, financial stability and payments. There have …

Unconventional monetary policies and central bank profits: Seigniorage as fiscal revenue in the aftermath of the global financial crisis

J Bibow - Levy Economics Institute, Working Papers Series WP, 2018 - papers.ssrn.com
This study investigates the evolution of central bank profits as fiscal revenue (or:
seigniorage) before and in the aftermath of the global financial crisis of 2008–9, focusing on …

Fiscal implications of interest rate normalization in the United States

H Bi, W Shen, SCS Yang - Canadian Journal of Economics …, 2022 - Wiley Online Library
We study the fiscal implications of interest rate normalization from the zero lower bound
(ZLB) in the United States. At the ZLB, falling tax revenues and real bond prices increase …

[PDF][PDF] Exiting from an Exchange Rate Floor in a Small Open Economy: Balance Sheet Implications of the Czech National Bank's Exchange Rate Commitment

M Franta, T Holub, B Saxa - International Journal of Central Banking, 2022 - ijcb.org
With the conduct of unconventional monetary policy after the global financial crisis, central
bank balance sheets have become a subject of renewed interest. The issues of central bank …

[PDF][PDF] Balance sheet implications of the Czech National Bank's exchange rate commitment

M Franta, T Holub, B Saxa - 2018 - cnb.cz
We present projections of the Czech National Bank's balance sheet after the discontinuation
of the exchange rate commitment. Our model addresses the situation of a large central bank …

Populism, economic policies, political pressure and central bank (in) dependence

D Masciandaro - BAFFI CAREFIN Centre Research Paper, 2019 - papers.ssrn.com
This article discusses the relationships between populism, economic policy design and
central bank independence (CBI). Assuming that 1) a macro (banking) shock can occur, 2) …

[PDF][PDF] Riksbankens balansräkning och finansiella oberoende

D Kjellberg, D Vestin - Penning-och valutapolitik, 2019 - riksbank.se
Ett finansiellt oberoende säkerställer att Riksbankens finansiella ställning inte ska kunna ha
en negativ inverkan på Riksbankens uppdrag gällande pris stabilitet, finansiell stabilitet och …

Populism, financial inequality and central bank independence: A political economics approach

D Masciandaro, F Passarelli - BAFFI CAREFIN Centre Research …, 2018 - papers.ssrn.com
This paper examines myopic, populist policies that guarantee short-term financial protection
of the people from the elite without regard for long-term fiscal or monetary distortions …

How do social planners design accounting standards? Evidence from central banks' accounting choices

I Goncharov, Z Novotny-Farkas - Evidence from Central Banks' …, 2022 - papers.ssrn.com
The design of an optimal accounting regime for central banks involves a complex tradeoff.
Transparent accounting can enhance central banks' credibility and, thus, aid the pursuit of …