Executive compensation: A survey of theory and evidence

A Edmans, X Gabaix, D Jenter - The handbook of the economics of …, 2017 - Elsevier
This paper reviews the theoretical and empirical literature on executive compensation. We
start by presenting data on the level of CEO and other top executive pay over time and …

Blockholders: A survey of theory and evidence

A Edmans, CG Holderness - The handbook of the economics of corporate …, 2017 - Elsevier
This paper reviews the theoretical and empirical literature on the role of blockholders (large
shareholders) in corporate governance. We start with the underlying property rights of public …

Corporate immunity to the COVID-19 pandemic

W Ding, R Levine, C Lin, W Xie - Journal of financial economics, 2021 - Elsevier
We evaluate the connection between corporate characteristics and the reaction of stock
returns to COVID-19 cases using data on more than 6,700 firms across 61 economies. The …

Managerial risk taking: A multitheoretical review and future research agenda

RE Hoskisson, F Chirico, J Zyung… - Journal of …, 2017 - journals.sagepub.com
Managerial risk taking is a critical aspect of strategic management. To improve competitive
advantage and performance, managers need to take risks, often in an uncertain …

Behavioral CEOs: The role of managerial overconfidence

U Malmendier, G Tate - Journal of Economic Perspectives, 2015 - aeaweb.org
In this paper, we provide a theoretical and empirical framework that allows us to synthesize
and assess the burgeoning literature on CEO overconfidence. We also provide novel …

Blockholders and corporate governance

A Edmans - Annu. Rev. Financ. Econ., 2014 - annualreviews.org
This paper reviews the theoretical and empirical literature on the channels through which
blockholders (large shareholders) engage in corporate governance. In classical models …

Generalists versus specialists: Lifetime work experience and chief executive officer pay

C Custódio, MA Ferreira, P Matos - Journal of Financial Economics, 2013 - Elsevier
We show that pay is higher for chief executive officers (CEOs) with general managerial skills
gathered during lifetime work experience. We use CEOs' résumés of Standard and Poor's …

Principal costs: A new theory for corporate law and governance

Z Goshen, R Squire - Colum. L. Rev., 2017 - HeinOnline
For the last forty years, the problem of agency costs has dominated the study of corporate
law and governance. 1 Agency costs result from the separation of control and ownership that …

[HTML][HTML] CEO compensation: Evidence from the field

A Edmans, T Gosling, D Jenter - Journal of Financial Economics, 2023 - Elsevier
We survey directors and investors on the objectives, constraints, and determinants of CEO
pay. We find that directors face constraints beyond participation and incentives, and that pay …

Who bleeds when the wolves bite: A flesh-and-blood perspective on hedge fund activism and our strange corporate governance system

LE Strine Jr - Yale LJ, 2016 - HeinOnline
Few topics are sexier among commentators on corporate governance now than whether
activist hedge funds are good for, a danger to, or of no real consequence to public …