Baïou and Balinski characterized the stable admissions polytope using a system of linear
inequalities. The structure of feasible solutions to this system of inequalities—fractional …

We motivate procedural fairness for matching mechanisms and study two procedurally fair
and stable mechanisms: employment by lotto (Aldershof et al., 1999) and the random order …

The stable matching problem sets the economic foundation of several practical applications
ranging from school choice and medical residency to ridesharing and refugee placement. It …

I introduce a class of algorithms called Deferred Acceptance with Compensation Chains
(DACC). DACC algorithms generalize the DA algorithms by Gale and Shapley [1962] by …

Given a two-sided market where each agent ranks those on the other side by preference, the
stable marriage problem calls for finding a perfect matching such that no pair of agents …

We study the assignment of indivisible goods to individuals when monetary transfers are not
allowed. Previous literature has mainly focused on efficiency (from both ex-ante and ex-post …

Can a stable matching that achieves high equity among the two sides of a market be
reached in quadratic time? The Deferred Acceptance (DA) algorithm finds a stable matching …

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Matching theory has been considered and applied in practical systems to handle the rational
and selfish problems of agents, offering mutational benefits for them over time. This chapter …

We apply the Rawlsian principle to a canonical discrete object allocation problem. A
matching is Rawlsian if it is impossible to improve the ranking of assignment for the worst-off …