The board of directors (ie board) has generally been perceived as the backbone of
corporate governance. Board is one of the most important internal corporate governance …

This paper develops a simple equilibrium model of CEO pay. CEOs have different talents
and are matched to firms in a competitive assignment model. In market equilibrium, a CEO's …

This paper examines whether corporate governance mechanisms affect earnings and
earnings management at the largest publicly traded bank holding companies in the United …

Managerial resources, defined as the skills and abilities of managers, are important
contributors to the entire bundle of firm resources that enable some firms to generate rents …

We examine hypothesised links between the board of directors and firm performance as
predicted by the three predominant theories in corporate governance research, namely …

This paper presents an assignment model of CEOs and firms. The distributions of CEO pay
levels and firms' market values are analyzed as the competitive equilibrium of a matching …

We develop a model that clarifies how to measure CEO incentive strength and how to
reconcile the enormous differences in pay sensitivities between executives in large and …

Much of the empirical literature that has examined the functional relationship between firm
value and managerial ownership levels assumes that managerial ownership levels are …

In this chapter, we address three pay for performance (PFP) questions. First, what are the
conceptual mechanisms by which PFP influences performance? Second, what programs do …

Market-based theories predict that differences in CEO skills lead to potentially large
differences in pay, but it is challenging to quantify the CEO skill premium in pay. In a first step …