Many countries have a large informal economy that is poorly measured in the national
accounts. I develop a two-sector small open economy business cycle model where one …

Motivated by recent developments in cyberwarfare, we study deterrence in a world where
attacks cannot be perfectly attributed to attackers. In the model, each of attackers may attack …

We study the design of monitoring in dynamic settings with moral hazard. An agent (eg a
firm) benefits from reputation for quality, and a principal (eg a regulator) can learn the …

We estimate social externalities of tax evasion in a model where congestion of the auditing
resources of local tax authorities generates a social multiplier. Identification is based on a …

We introduce intention-based social preferences into mechanism design. We explore
information structures that differ with respect to what is commonly known about the weight …

This paper studies the implications of tax evasion for the optimal design of central bank
digital currency (CBDC). I build a general equilibrium framework to explicitly allow tax …

We study collusion among firms against imperfectly monitored environmental regulation.
Firms increase variable profits by violating regulation and reduce expected noncompliance …

Most models of optimal income tax enforcement assume that income is either random or
solely remunerates labor, neglecting that auditing strategies may depend on observable …

Tax collection with limited enforcement capacity may be consistent with both high-and low-
delinquency regimes: high delinquency reduces the effectiveness of threats, thereby …

In this paper, we use data from developing countries to argue that sovereign defaults are
often caused by fiscal pressures generated by large-scale domestic defaults. We argue that …