Recent work in social cognition has moved beyond a focus on how people process social
rewards to examine how healthy people represent other agents and how this is altered in …

Publisher Summary This chapter discusses the strategic models of entry deterrence that the
models fall into three categories:(1) Preemption–these models explain how a firm claims …

We construct a model where the reputational concern of the long-run player to look good in
the current period results in the loss of all surplus. This is in contrast to the bulk of the …

Consider a Bayesian collective decision problem in which the preferences of agents are
private information. We provide a general demonstration that the utility costs associated with …

This paper offers a systematic exploration of reputation mechanism design in trading
environments with opportunistic sellers of commonly known cost and ability parameters …

We study the long‐run sustainability of reputations in games with imperfect public
monitoring. It is impossible to maintain a permanent reputation for playing a strategy that …

The repeated Prisoner's Dilemma is usually known as a story of tit-for-tat (TFT). This
remarkable strategy has won both of Robert Axelrod's tournaments. TFT does whatever the …

This paper studies the set of equilibrium payoffs in repeated games with long-and short-run
players and little discounting. Because the short-run players are unconcerned about the …

Commerce depends on buyers and sellers fulfilling their contractual obligations;
mechanisms inducing such performance are essential to well-functioning markets. Internet …

We introduce a class of strategies that generalizes examples constructed in two‐player
games under imperfect private monitoring. A sequential equilibrium is belief‐free if, after …