We consider dynamic cooperative games, where the worth of coalitions varies over time
according to the history of allocations. When defining the core of a dynamic game, we allow …

Modeling club structures as bipartite directed networks, we formulate the problem of club
formation with multiple memberships as a noncooperative game of network formation and …

When individuals interact in a network, links are often asymmetric and of varying intensity. I
study a model whereby networks emerge from agents maximizing utility from continuous …

The relationship between our general equilibrium model with multi-member households and
club models with multiple private goods is investigated. The main distinction in the …

We extend the ratio equilibrium concept (Kaneko, 1977a, b) to local public good economies
by defining and analyzing Local Public Good Equilibrium (LPGE). Similar to ratio …

We develop a general theoretical framework that allows us to study the group structures that
are going to emerge at equilibrium in overlapping coalition settings. We introduce the notion …

We use club theory for the first time to provide a model of securities exchange (SX)
formation. We think of a SX as a local public good that allows its traders to diversify risk by …

We introduce a model of a local public goods economy with a continuum of agents and
jurisdictions with finite but unbounded populations, where the set of possible projects for …

We consider a public good provision game with voluntary participation. Agents participating
in the game provide a public good and pay the fees according to a mechanism (allocation …

Small groups of players of a cooperative game with side payments are “effective” if almost all
gains to group formation can be realized by groups of players bounded in absolute size. Per …