This paper employs agent-based simulation to study energy market performance and, in
particular, capacity withholding and the emergence of tacit collusion among the market …

Wholesale electricity markets have several features that increase the likelihood of collusion,
including frequent interaction, multimarket contact, and a high degree of information …

The purpose of this study was to design an auction mechanism for use by the Regional
Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI) for selling emission allowances. We conducted a series of …

We analyze a drastic price increase in the German auction market for reserve power that did
not appear to be driven by increased costs. Studying the market structure and bidding …

In electricity day-ahead markets organized as uniform price auction, a small reduction in
supply in times of high demand can cause substantial increases in price. We use a unique …

Wholesale electricity markets may not produce competitive outcomes, either as a result of
the exercise of market power, or through problems of implicit collusion. In comparison with …

Since the 90's, an increasing number of countries have organized wholesale markets for
electricity. Although the market rules may differ from country to country, the trading of …

We examine allegations that firms in Alberta's electricity industry manipulated public
information to coordinate in the wholesale market. We investigate whether bids by firms who …

We examine the role of information transparency in Alberta's wholesale electricity market.
Using data on firms' bidding behavior, we analyze whether firms utilize information revealed …

In the context of agent-based simulation framework of collusion, this paper seeks for two-
sided tacit collusion among supply-side and demand-side participants in a constrained …