Compensation and peer effects in competing sales teams
This paper examines how compensation systems impact peer effects and competition in
collocated sales teams. We use department store sales data to show that compensation …
collocated sales teams. We use department store sales data to show that compensation …
Operational slack and venture survival
A Azadegan, PC Patel, V Parida - Production and …, 2013 - journals.sagepub.com
Slack can act as a double‐edged sword. While it can buffer against environmental threats to
help ensure business continuity, slack can also be costly and reduce profitability. In this …
help ensure business continuity, slack can also be costly and reduce profitability. In this …
[图书][B] An economic theory of managerial firms: strategic delegation in oligopoly
L Lambertini - 2017 - taylorfrancis.com
The separation between ownership and control has become common practice over the last
century, in most medium and large firms across the world. Throughout the twentieth century …
century, in most medium and large firms across the world. Throughout the twentieth century …
10. Strategic delegation in oligopoly
M Kopel, M Pezzino - Handbook of Game Theory and Industrial …, 2018 - books.google.com
In his bookStrategies of Commitment, Nobel Prize winner Thomas Schelling discusses
several examples of the functioning of commitment strategies and their importance …
several examples of the functioning of commitment strategies and their importance …
How financial slack affects firm performance: evidence from US industrial firms
SH Lee - Journal of economic research, 2011 - kiss.kstudy.com
This study examines two competing views on how financial slack affects firm performance:
resource-based behavioral theory and agency theory. By investigating a large panel data …
resource-based behavioral theory and agency theory. By investigating a large panel data …
Managerial compensation, product market competition and fraud
R Andergassen - International Review of Economics & Finance, 2016 - Elsevier
We study a model in which a manager can engage in unobservable cost-cutting effort,
possesses private information about firm profits and where shareholders employ stock and …
possesses private information about firm profits and where shareholders employ stock and …
Strategic incentives for innovations and market competition
E Chalioti, K Serfes - International Journal of Industrial Organization, 2017 - Elsevier
We consider a principal–agent model to provide a general analysis of how risk affects
incentives of firms who invest in cost-reducing R&D and compete in the product market. We …
incentives of firms who invest in cost-reducing R&D and compete in the product market. We …
Individual preferences, organization, and competition in a model of R&D incentive provision
N Lacetera, L Zirulia - Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 2012 - Elsevier
Understanding the organization of R&D activities requires the simultaneous consideration of
scientific workers' talent and tastes, companies' organizational choices, and the …
scientific workers' talent and tastes, companies' organizational choices, and the …
The strategic value of quantity forcing contracts
D Martimort, S Piccolo - American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 2010 - aeaweb.org
We explore the strategic value of quantity forcing contracts in a manufacturer-retailer
environment under both adverse selection and moral hazard. Manufacturers dealing with …
environment under both adverse selection and moral hazard. Manufacturers dealing with …
Incentive contracts under product market competition and R&D spillovers
E Chalioti - Economic Theory, 2015 - Springer
This paper studies cost-reducing R&D incentives in a principal-agent model with product
market competition. It argues that moral hazard does not necessarily decrease firms' profits …
market competition. It argues that moral hazard does not necessarily decrease firms' profits …