Compensation and peer effects in competing sales teams

TY Chan, J Li, L Pierce - Management Science, 2014 - pubsonline.informs.org
This paper examines how compensation systems impact peer effects and competition in
collocated sales teams. We use department store sales data to show that compensation …

Operational slack and venture survival

A Azadegan, PC Patel, V Parida - Production and …, 2013 - journals.sagepub.com
Slack can act as a double‐edged sword. While it can buffer against environmental threats to
help ensure business continuity, slack can also be costly and reduce profitability. In this …

[图书][B] An economic theory of managerial firms: strategic delegation in oligopoly

L Lambertini - 2017 - taylorfrancis.com
The separation between ownership and control has become common practice over the last
century, in most medium and large firms across the world. Throughout the twentieth century …

10. Strategic delegation in oligopoly

M Kopel, M Pezzino - Handbook of Game Theory and Industrial …, 2018 - books.google.com
In his bookStrategies of Commitment, Nobel Prize winner Thomas Schelling discusses
several examples of the functioning of commitment strategies and their importance …

How financial slack affects firm performance: evidence from US industrial firms

SH Lee - Journal of economic research, 2011 - kiss.kstudy.com
This study examines two competing views on how financial slack affects firm performance:
resource-based behavioral theory and agency theory. By investigating a large panel data …

Managerial compensation, product market competition and fraud

R Andergassen - International Review of Economics & Finance, 2016 - Elsevier
We study a model in which a manager can engage in unobservable cost-cutting effort,
possesses private information about firm profits and where shareholders employ stock and …

Strategic incentives for innovations and market competition

E Chalioti, K Serfes - International Journal of Industrial Organization, 2017 - Elsevier
We consider a principal–agent model to provide a general analysis of how risk affects
incentives of firms who invest in cost-reducing R&D and compete in the product market. We …

Individual preferences, organization, and competition in a model of R&D incentive provision

N Lacetera, L Zirulia - Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 2012 - Elsevier
Understanding the organization of R&D activities requires the simultaneous consideration of
scientific workers' talent and tastes, companies' organizational choices, and the …

The strategic value of quantity forcing contracts

D Martimort, S Piccolo - American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 2010 - aeaweb.org
We explore the strategic value of quantity forcing contracts in a manufacturer-retailer
environment under both adverse selection and moral hazard. Manufacturers dealing with …

Incentive contracts under product market competition and R&D spillovers

E Chalioti - Economic Theory, 2015 - Springer
This paper studies cost-reducing R&D incentives in a principal-agent model with product
market competition. It argues that moral hazard does not necessarily decrease firms' profits …