When multiple charities, social programs and community projects simultaneously vie for
funding, donors risk mis-coordinating their contributions leading to an inefficient distribution …

We analyze linear, weakest-link and best-shot public goods games where a distinguished
team member, the team allocator, has property rights over the benefits from the public good …

We experimentally investigate the effect of pre-bargaining communication on productive
incentives in a multilateral bargaining game with joint production under two conditions …

We use a laboratory experiment to investigate the extent to which leaders—faced with
opportunistic incentives—employ monitoring to improve team production. Participants are …

We consider the class of linear voluntary contribution games under the general assumption
of heterogeneous endowments. In this context, we assess the performance of the Galbraith …

We examine the allocation of a voluntarily-provided collective good with inequality in
endowments or productive capabilities. After group members choose their contributions to a …

Inequality reduces the ability of communities to work together. Recent policy proposals seem
to presume that reducing inequality may allow groups to improve outcomes. We …

We conduct an experiment to investigate the use of peer evaluations for compensation
purposes. Although organizations often rely on peer evaluations for incentive compensation …

We investigate whether fairness concerns overrule strategic behaviour in legislative
bargaining with entitlements. In a lab experiment, we vary bargaining power by using either …

Leadership plays an important role for the efficient and fair solution of social dilemmas but
the effectiveness of a leader can vary substantially. Two main factors of leadership impact …