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For dynamic games we consider the idea that a player, at every stage of the game, will
always believe that his opponents will choose rationally in the future. This is the basis for the …

This paper reconsiders the problem of a durable-good monopolist who cannot make
intertemporal commitments. The buyer's valuation is binary and his private information. The …

A seller has an uncertain number of perishable goods to sell in each period. Privately
informed buyers arrive stochastically to the market. Buyers are risk neutral, patient, and have …

We study incomplete information games with ambiguity averse players. Our focus is on
equilibrium concepts satisfying sequential optimality—each player's strategy is optimal at …

This book has grown out of a decade and a half of joint research that resulted in the articles
underlying it (Alós-Ferrer and Ritzberger 2005a, b, Alós-Ferrer and Ritzberger 2008, Alós …

This paper develops a general definition of perfect Bayesian equilibrium (PBE) for extensive-
form games. It is based on a new consistency condition for the players' beliefs, called plain …

A central aspect of strategic reasoning in sequential games consists in anticipating how co-
players would react to information about past play, which in turn depends on how co-players …

We provide a general notion of perfect Bayesian equilibrium which can be applied to
arbitrary extensive-form games and is intermediate between subgame-perfect equilibrium …

Heifetz, Meier, and Schipper (2013) introduced dynamic game with unawareness consisting
of a partially ordered set of games in extensive form. Here, we study the normal form of …