Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Private Monitoring | The Review of Economic Studies |
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We introduce a new model of repeated games in large populations with random matching,
overlapping generations, and limited records of past play. We prove that steady-state …

We study the repeated prisoner's dilemma with random matching, a canonical model of
community enforcement with decentralized information. We assume that (1) with small …

We study anonymous repeated games where players may be “commitment types” who
always take the same action. We establish a stark anti-folk theorem: if the distribution of the …

This paper develops a framework for studying repeated matching markets. The model
departs from the Gale–Shapley matching model by having a fixed set of long‐lived players …

I analyze a reputation game between a patient player and a sequence of short-run players.
Each short-run player observes the number of times that the patient player took each of his …

I survey models of cooperation in large populations. Topics include repeated games with
public monitoring, random matching games, games on networks, infinitepopulation games …

Societies today face important challenges related to cooperation, which is needed among
individuals who interact at a nonregular frequency. In this context, cooperation can be …

Many markets rely on traders truthfully communicating who has cheated in the past and
ostracizing those traders from future trade. This paper investigates when truthful …

Motivated by the problem of sustaining cooperation in large groups with limited information,
we analyze the relationship between group size, monitoring precision, and incentive …