Central bank digital currency: Central banking for all?

J Fernández-Villaverde, D Sanches, L Schilling… - Review of Economic …, 2021 - Elsevier
The introduction of a central bank digital currency (CBDC) allows the central bank to engage
in large-scale intermediation by competing with private financial intermediaries for deposits …

Central bank digital currency: Stability and information

T Keister, C Monnet - Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, 2022 - Elsevier
We study how introducing a central bank digital currency (CBDC) would affect the stability of
the banking system. We present a model that captures a concern commonly raised in policy …

Collective moral hazard, maturity mismatch, and systemic bailouts

E Farhi, J Tirole - American Economic Review, 2012 - aeaweb.org
The article shows that time-consistent, imperfectly targeted support to distressed institutions
makes private leverage choices strategic complements. When everyone engages in maturity …

Banks, liquidity management, and monetary policy

J Bianchi, S Bigio - Econometrica, 2022 - Wiley Online Library
We develop a tractable model of banks' liquidity management with an over‐the‐counter
interbank market to study the credit channel of monetary policy. Deposits circulate randomly …

Central bank digital currency: When price and bank stability collide

L Schilling, J Fernández-Villaverde, H Uhlig - Journal of Monetary …, 2024 - Elsevier
This paper shows the existence of a central bank trilemma. When a central bank is involved
in financial intermediation, either directly through a central bank digital currency (CBDC) or …

Incomplete information in macroeconomics: Accommodating frictions in coordination

GM Angeletos, C Lian - Handbook of macroeconomics, 2016 - Elsevier
This chapter studies how incomplete information helps accommodate frictions in
coordination, leading to novel insights on the joint determination of expectations and …

Bailouts and financial fragility

T Keister - The Review of Economic Studies, 2016 - academic.oup.com
Should policy makers be prevented from bailing out investors in the event of a crisis? I study
this question in a model of financial intermediation with limited commitment. When a crisis …

Financial crises, dollarization, and lending of last resort in open economies

L Bocola, G Lorenzoni - American Economic Review, 2020 - aeaweb.org
Foreign currency debt is considered a source of financial instability in emerging markets. We
propose a theory in which liability dollarization arises from an insurance motive of domestic …

New monetarist economics: Models

S Williamson, R Wright - Handbook of monetary economics, 2010 - Elsevier
The purpose of this paper is to discuss some of the models used in New Monetarist
Economics, which is our label for a body of recent work on money, banking, payments …

Competition and stability in banking

X Vives - 2010 - papers.ssrn.com
I review the state of the art of the academic theoretical and empirical literature on the
potential trade-off between competition and stability in banking. There are two basic …