We do a game-theoretic analysis of leader election, under the assumption that each agent
prefers to have some leader than to have no leader at all. We show that it is possible to …

It is impossible to solve the Byzantine consensus problem in an open network of n
participants if only 2n/3 or less of them are correct. As blockchains need to solve consensus …

Consider a set of participants invited to execute a protocol Π. The protocol will incur some
cost to run while in the end (or at regular intervals), it will populate and update local …

Following [4] we extend and generalize the game-theoretic model of distributed computing,
identifying different utility functions that encompass different potential preferences of players …

We do a game-theoretic analysis of leader election, under the assumption that each agent
prefers to have some leader than no leader at all. We show that it is possible to obtain a fair …

Use of game theory and mechanism design in cloud security is a well-studied topic. When
applicable, it has the advantages of being efficient and simple compared to cryptography …

We study a game theoretic model where a coalition of processors might collude to bias the
outcome of the protocol, where we assume that the processors always prefer any legitimate …

Blockchain systems need to solve consensus despite the presence of rational users and
failures. The notion of (k,t)-robustness is key to derive impossibility results with k rational …

We propose cryptographic rational secret sharing protocols over general networks. In a
general network, the dealer may not have direct connections to each player, and players …

The question of what global information must distributed rational agents a-priori know about
the network in order for equilibrium to be possible is researched here. Until now, distributed …