A behavioral theory of competitive political parties

K Strom - American journal of political science, 1990 - JSTOR
The rational choice tradition has generated three models of competitive political party
behavior: the vote-seeking party, the office-seeking party, and the policy-seeking party …

Constraints on cabinet formation in parliamentary democracies

K Strøm, I Budge, MJ Laver - American journal of political science, 1994 - JSTOR
Coalition theory typically treats political parties involved in government formation in
parliamentary democracies as if they were unconstrained players in an institution-free world …

Power indices for political and financial decision making: A review

G Gambarelli - Annals of Operations Research, 1994 - Springer
Power indices for political and financial decision making: A review Page 1 Section IV Group
Decision Making Through Voting Page 2 Page 3 Annals of Operations Research 51(1994)165-173 …

Assessing success and decisiveness in voting situations

A Laruelle, F Valenciano - Social Choice and Welfare, 2005 - Springer
In this paper we propose a simple model for measuring 'success' or 'decisiveness' in voting
situations. For an assessment of these features two inputs are claimed to be necessary: the …

[图书][B] Bilateral bargaining: theory and applications

S Napel - 2002 - books.google.com
This book investigates bargaining between two agents. Its objective is to present, to extend,
and to apply the present state of theoretical knowledge. A wide range of questions will be …

Winners and losers in the Council: Voting power consequences of EU enlargements

T Raunio, M Wiberg - JCMS: Journal of Common Market …, 1998 - Wiley Online Library
Who will have power in the enlarged European Union? How will the enlargement of the EU
alter the configuration of Member States'a priori voting power in the Council of Ministers …

[PDF][PDF] Una teoría sobre el comportamiento de los partidos políticos competitivos

K Strom - Andamios, 2013 - scielo.org.mx
La tradición de la elección racional ha generado tres modelos sobre el comportamiento de
los partidos políticos competitivos: el partido que va en busca del voto, el partido que va en …

When is size a liability? Bargaining power in minimal winning coalitions

SJ Brams, PC Fishburn - Journal of Theoretical Politics, 1995 - journals.sagepub.com
Riker'ssize principle'predicts that only minimal winning coalitions (MWCs) will form in n-
person zero-sum games that satisfy certain conditions. After summarizing the logic of this …

Generalizing and modifying the Hoede-Bakker index

A Rusinowska, H de Swart - … and Applications of Relational Structures as …, 2006 - Springer
In this paper, we generalize the Hoede-Bakker index, which is a measure for the power of
agents in a network, taking into account the mutual influences of the agents. We adopt sets …

Vom ungeliebten Störenfried zum akzeptierten Paradigma? Zum Stand der (neuen) politischen Ökonomie in Deutschland

K Holzinger - Politische Vierteljahresschrift, 2009 - Springer
Der Beitrag präsentiert den Stand der ökonomischen Analyse von Politik in Deutschland.
Nach einer kurzen Skizze des Grundmodells, der Gegenstandsbereiche und des …