John and Lisa are offered additional insurance against the risk of a heart disease. They
would like to know the probability of developing such a disease over the next 10 years. The …

We study the revenue maximization problem of a seller who is partially informed about the
distribution of buyer's valuations, only knowing its first N moments. The seller chooses the …

We consider a robust version of the classic problem of optimal monopoly pricing with
incomplete information. In the robust version, the seller faces model uncertainty and only …

A profit‐maximizing seller has a single unit of a good to sell. The bidders have a pure
common value that is drawn from a distribution that is commonly known. The seller does not …

A contract with multiple agents may be susceptible to collusion. We show that agents'
collusion imposes no cost in a large class of circumstances with risk neutral agents …

This paper proposes a model of decision under ambiguity deemed vector expected utility, or
VEU. In this model, an uncertain prospect, or Savage act, is assessed according to (a) a …

This paper studies mechanism design when agents are maxmin expected utility maximizers.
A first result gives a general necessary condition for a social choice rule to be …

This paper considers mechanism design problems in environments with ambiguity‐sensitive
individuals. The novel idea is to introduce ambiguity in mechanisms so as to exploit the …

We study a persuasion game à la Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011) where players are
ambiguity averse with maxmin expected utility (Gilboa and Schmeidler, 1989). With no prior …

We propose a model of preferences in which the effect of randomization on ambiguity
depends on how the unknown probability law is determined. We adopt the framework of …