We study the implications of aggregating consumers' purchase histories into scores that
proxy for unobserved willingness to pay. A long-lived consumer interacts with a sequence of …

We study a principal–agent setting in which both sides learn about future profitability from
output, and the project can be abandoned/terminated if profitability is too low. With learning …

This paper examines the interplay between career concerns and market structure. Ability
and effort are complements: effort increases the probability that a skilled agent achieves a …

Abstract Performance evaluation (“rating”) systems not only provide information to users but
also motivate the rated worker. This article solves for the optimal (effort-maximizing) rating …

We consider learning and signalling in a dynamic Cournot oligopoly where firms have
private information about their production costs and only observe the market price, which is …

This paper considers dynamic moral hazard settings, in which the agent's actions have
consequences over a long horizon. To maintain incentives, the optimal contract defers the …

This paper studies the interplay between information and incentives in principalagent
relationships with career concerns, that is when the agent wants to be perceived as of high …

We characterize optimal asset management contracts in a classic portfolio‐investment
setting. When the agent has access to hidden savings, his incentives to misbehave depend …

I examine how career concerns are shaped by the nature of productive actions taken by
workers. A worker's skills follow a Gaussian process with an endogenous component …

We examine the relationship between job security and productivity in a fixed wage
workerfirm relationship facing match quality uncertainty. The worker's action affects both …